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NOTE AND COMMENT
And still their devious course pursue
To keep the path that others do.
But how the wise old wood-gods laugh,
Who saw the first primeval calf!
Ah! many things this tale might teach;
But I am not ordained to preach.
THE APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS ACT IN MONTANA
In 1922 the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act was
drafted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Al-
though several states had adopted a declaratory act of this na-
ture prior to this time, the majority have since adopted the Uni-
form Act as drafted by the Commissioners. Up to March 1943,
the Federal Government' and all but eight states' had adopted
declaratory judgments acts with more than three thousand cases
having been adjudicated under the provisions of such acts. Ac-
cording to an eminent authority' on the subject, more declara-
tory judgments were rendered in the seven year period from
1934 to 1941 than in the time prior to 1934, indicating the in-
creasing awareness by bench and bar of its value as a judicial
remedy.
Montana in 1935 became the twenty-first state to adopt the
Uniform Act' but since its enactment the Montana Supreme
Court has only considered eleven cases' which asked for or in-
volved declaratory judgments. Whether these eleven cases rep-
resent the total need for declaratory judgments can, of course,
only be a matter of conjecture, but when compared with the ex-
tensive use made of it in other jurisdictions it would seem that
members of the bar have not taken full advantage of the Act.
'See Uniform Laws Annotated No. 9 (1940) Cumulative Annual Pocket
Part p. 70.
'48 STAT. 955 (1934), 28 U.S.C. §400 (1940).
'Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Oklahoma.
'BoncHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMErNTS (2nd ed. 1941) p. vii.
aR.C.M. 1935 §9835.1-9835.16.
'Toole County Irrigation Dist. v. State (1937) 104 Mont. 420, 67 P. (2d)
989; Tongue River and Yellowstone River Irrigation Dist. v. Hyslop et
al. (1939) 109 Mont. 190, 96 P. (2d) 273; Mulholland v. Ayers et al
(1940) 109 Mont. 558, 99 P. (2d) 234; Blackford v. Judith Basin Coun-
ty (1940) 109 Mont. 578, 98 P. (2d) 872; State ex rel. Butte Brewing
Co. v. District Court (1940) 110 Mont. 250, 100 P. (2d) 932; Vantura
v. Mont. Liquor Control Board (1942) 113 Mont. 265, 124 P. (2d) 569;
Gullickson v. Mitchell (1942) 113 Mont. 359, 126 P. (2d) 1106; Pollard
v. Mont. Liquor Control Board (1942) 114 Mont. 220, 131 P. (2d)
974; Bottomly, Atty. Gen. v. Meagher County (194) 114 Mont. 220,
133 P. (2d) 770; State ex rel. Davidson v. Ford, Gov. (1943) 115 Mont.
165, 141 P. (2d) 373; Carey, State Treas. v. McFatridge et al. (1943)
115 Mont. 278, 142 P. (2d) 229.
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A brief discussion of the Act and its application in Mon-
tana for the first five years after its enactment is presented in
a comment published in Volume II of the MONTANA LAW RE-
vImw.' The writer there dealt with five cases in which he pointed
out that "in none of these cases did the Court discuss the his-
tory, general provisions or the purpose of the Uniform Act."
That statement is still applicable to all the cases that have sub-
sequently been brought under the Act. However, it was the
conclusion of the writer that the issues raised in each case
presented a proper cause for a declaratory judgment. In those
cases the Declaratory Judgments Act was used "to determine
the validity of irrigation assessment liens on state owned lands,
to determine the constitutionality and application of election
laws as it affected an office holder, to determine the constitution-
ality of a tax statute and to determine the rights of an insured
as against the insurers."
Since that time the Declaratory Judgments Act has only
been used to determine the construction and constitutionality
of statutes. That declaratory judgments are especially appro-
priate for the settlement of such questions is attested by numer-
ous authorities and the wording of the Act itself. The Act
states that
"any person... whose rights, status or other legal relations
are affected by a statute... may have determined any ques-
tion of construction or validity arising under the statute
... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal
relations thereunder."
'Paulson, The Application of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
in Montana. 2 MoNT. L. Bmv. 106 (1941).
"'If legal powers of the government or officials are challenged by the
persons affected or if an official .. . is left in dilemma because of
doubt and fear of exercising powers which may expose him to personal
liability . . . the state has an interest in removing the doubt before
disaster has occurred." Borchard, Judilcial Relief for Peril and In-
seourity (1932) 45 H~av. L. Rgv. 793, 796
"The procedure is peculiarly appropriate to public laws, because
specific relief is generally unnecessary against a great public author-
ity which Is extremely unlikely to break the law deliberately." Jen-
nings, Declaratory Judgments Against Public Authorities in England.
(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 407, 412
"The state has a special responsibility... to supply the simplest pos-
sible procedure for the clarification of the rules by which governmental
bodies and public officers are guided and to make it as easy as prac-
ticable for the individual who is subject to its jurisdiction to ascer-
tain his public status, rights, duties, liabilities, privileges or immuni-
ties." Ellingwood, Declaratory Judgments in Public Lau (1934) 29
Ii. L. Rw. 1,30.
"B.C.M. 1935, 19835.2.
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Borchard" in his treatise on DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS em-
phasizes the value of .the declaratory judgment as applied to
this particular subject with this statement:
"In the twentieth century, with its kaleidoscopic changes
and the resulting necessity of ever new legislation to main-
tain the social equilibrium, there has been a special need for
a speedy determination of the meaning of legislation in its
application to individuals; and in countries which permit
constitutionality to be raised, there has been an ever increas-
ing challenge to the validity of legislative acts."
Numerous cases" brought under the Act admit that declara-
tory judgments are an answer to this challenge,' but at times
the question arises whether an advisory opinion or declaratory
judgment is desired as to the meaning of the statute." This
difficulty is caused not by the similarity between advisory opin-
ions and declaratory judgments but by a failure of courts to look
past the prayer for relief to the substance of the action to deter-
mine
"whether the plaintiff or defendant have a sufficient and
adequately conflicting legal interest to justify the rendering
of a judgment and whether the judgment applies to a con-
crete factual issue-in other words whether there is a justi-
ciable controversy.'
The Montana Supreme Court, with possibly one exception,
has not been confounded by this matter and has given the Act
the liberal construction enjoined upon the court.
"*Borchard, op. oft. supra note 4, p. 765.
"School District v. Sheridan Community High School (1930) 130 Kan.
749, 288 P. 733; Wingate v. Flynn (1931) 256 N.Y. 690, 177 N.E. 195;
Held in Wingate v. Flynn, supra, that public officers are entitled to
have their legal duties judicially determined by a proceeding for de-
claratory judgment; that in this way only can disastrous results of
well intentioned, but illegal, acts be avoided with certainty. See also
cases collected in 12 A. L. R. 84; 19 A. L. R. 1132; 50 A. L. R. 51; 68
A. L. IL 126; 87 A. L. I. 1236.
""Declaratory judgment proceedings have frequently been employed to
determine questions as to construction or validity of statutes, ordi-
nances and other governmental regulations." 16 Am. Juris. pp. 296,
297, §24; see also 545 and 46, pp. 318, 319.
"Controversies involving the interpretation of statutes may be settled
under the declaratory judgment law, but those controversies must in-
clude rights claimed by one of the parties and denied by the other and
not be merely as to the meaning of the statute." William v. Flood
(1928) 124 Kan. 728, 262 P. 563 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis
(1927) 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 291; Revis v. Daugherty (1926) 215
Ky. 823, 287 S. W. 28; Garden City News v. Hurst (1929) 129 Kan.
365, 282 P. 720; Borchard, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 72.
"Borchard, op. cit. 8upra note 4, p. 76.
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In Vantura v. Montana Liquor Control Board,' Vantura de-
sired a declaration as to the construction of statutes pertaining
to liquor license fees. He maintained that as he lived in a town
of less than two thousand he was only subject to a payment of a
fee of $200.00 as was specified by statute.' The Liquor Control
Board, on the other hand, contended that although his place of
business was in a town of less than two thousand, it was also
within a radius of five miles of a city of ten thousand and he
therefore should pay a fee of $600.00."8 The Court declared "we
think upone the reading of the entire Act taken as a whole...
the five mile rule does not apply to an applicant who is situated
within the boundary of a city or incorporated" town, the license
fee for which is definitely fixed by the Act."
The aftermath of this case was Pollard v. Montana Liquor
Control Board." Because the Court in the Vantura case had de-
cided that the five mile rule did not apply to incorporated towns,
the Board concluded that it did apply to unincorporated towns
and demanded that plaintiff and others who had been brought in
as defendants pay a fee of $600.00. Pollard brought action un-
der the DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT to secure from the Court
a declaration of whether or not the statutes differentiated be-
tween incorporated and unincorporated towns in fixing the fee.
After deciding that such a distinction was not intended, the
Court then defined the word "town" as used in the Act to deter-
mine if the licensee operated in a "town" or rural area.
The questions in these cases were not moot or fictitious.
There were real adverse parties with conflicting claims that had
arisen because of the uncertainty of the statutes in question.
Ordinarily, before a cause of actions exists one party must suffer
a wrong at the hands of another. This element, it is true, was
lacking in these cases, but its very absence proclaims the value of
the declaratory action. Pollard or Vantura were not required
to first submit to the Board's interpretation of the statutes, pay
the $600.00 and then trust that they might obtain a refund after
a more circuitous and litigious route had obtained for them what
they claimed the statute meant. As a matter of fact, if they had
neglected to protest payment under this latter procedure, their
only hope of a refund would have been by legislative enact-
1(1942) 113 Mont. 265, 124 P. (2d) 569.
"
6Ch. 163, LAWS OF MONTANA 1939; Ch. 84, LAWS OF MONTANA 1937.
"7Ch. 221, LAWS OF MONTANA 1939.
"Italics mine.
"(1942) 114 Mont. 44, 131 P. (2d) 974.
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ment.e Thus, the Declaratory Judgments Act was of definite
value to the litigants in these two cases in that it speeded up the
administration of justice and reduced the expense of liigation.
While the Vantura and Pollard cases represent actions for
declaratory judgments by individuals to secure the meaning of
statutes, another very common use of the declaratory judgment
is "where the government or governmental officer has decided
upon a given course of action and wishes a judicial opinion as to
the permissibility of the end desired or the necessity of going
about it in a particular way. If the official has taken some ac-
tion and the validity of this action is challenged so as to estab-
lish an issue, it is a clear case for declaratory judgment. If,
however, the official asks for a declaration concerning the legal-
ity of his proposed official conduct it is very probable that he
is asking for nothing more than an advisory opinion.' "
This writer submits that in the case of State ex rel Davidson
v. Ford' an advisory opinion was what the plaintiff was really
seeking. In this case an original proceeding was brought by
the state on the relation of Davidson and others, individually
and as the Veterans Welfare Commission against Governor Ford
to obtain a declaration as to the validity of a recent statute.n
The Bill in question not only provided for an appropriation for
the Veterans Welfare Commission, but in addition, provided that
the Commission was to allow claims in the same manner as other
claims against the state were allowed. To this latter feature the
Commission objected because it made the administration of its
office more burdensome. To relieve itself of this burden it
sought to have this part of the act declared unconstitutional on
the ground that the Bill contained more than one subject not
clearly expressed in its title." The Court, without discussing
the propriety of the declaratory judgment as applied to a case
such as this, declared that "so long as the incidental provisions
of an appropriation bill are germane to the purposes of the ap-
propriation it does not conflict with any constitutional provi-
sion."
A closer analysis of the relief sought would have revealed
to the Court that the relators, rather than seeking a declaration
that would adjudicate a controversy arising under the statute,
2In re Pomeroy (1915) 51 Mont. 119, 115 P. 333; First National Bank v.
Sanders County (1929) 85 Mont. 150, 279 P. 247.
wEllingwood, Declaratory Judgments in Public Law, (1934) 29 Iu. L.
Rzv. 1,80.
-(1943) 115 Mont. 165, 141 P. (2d) 373.
"House Bill 151, LAws oF MONTANA, 1943.24MONT. CoNqsr. Art. V, §23.
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were really seeking a declaration that would relieve them of
onerous duties imposed by the statute. They had neither taken
any action nor had threatened to take'any action that was chal-
lenged by another. It is a general rule in declaratory actions as
in executory relief that courts will not pass on the constitutional-
ity of an act unless conflicting claims arise thereunder, but con-
flicting claims are not raised by merely naming an executive of-
ficer of the state charged with the duty of enforcing the laws.'
The Declaratory Act," it is true, does state that where a statute
is alleged to be unconstitutional the Attorney General of the
state is to "also" be served with a copy of the proceedings, but
this has not been interpreted to mean that by this simple ex-
pedient a controversy can be created. This result is supported
by the view in many cases that the Attorney General is not con-
sidered as a "necessary" party to actions such as this." One
writer" suggests that the word "also" as used in the statute in-
dicates that the Attorney General was not necessarily to be con-
sidered the real adverse party. Several courts have attempted
to justify declaratory actions of this character where public in-
terest has been sufficiently involved or where an exigency de-
manding immediate judicial attention was present." Although
the facts do not emphasize the exigency of the present case so
as to justify granting a declaratory judgment,-if it can be justi-
fied on this ground,-an exigency may have existed inasmuch
as the Court took original jurisdiction of the case. In the three
cases remaining to be discussed the Court was careful to point
out that it accepted original jurisdiction of a proceeding under
the Declaratory Judgments Act because of the emergency pre-
sented and the consequent inadequacy of ordinary appellate
"A public officer cannot transform a request for judicial advise into a
declaratory action by making the attorney general of the state a de-
fendant to the action when the latter has not duties to perform that
are connected with the questions put by the plaintiff. Revis v. Dauther-
ty, op. cit. supra note 13, Perry v. City of Elizabethton 160 Tenn. 102,
22 S. W. (2d) 354; 68 A. L. R. 132; Ellingwood, op. cit. supra note 21,
p. 20.
-R.C.M. 1935, §9835.11.
"Hessick v. Moynihan (1927) 83 Colo. 43, 262 P. 907; Little v. Smith
(1927) 124 Kan. 237, 257 P. 959; Evans v. Baldridge (1928) 294 Pa.
142, 144 AtL 97.
"Ellingwood, op. oil. supra note 21, p. 186.
0In some instances courts have entered declaratory judgments as to the
validity of statutes notwithstanding the seeming absence of a justici-
able controversy. Thus where the court thought the declaration sought
was really advisory it accepted jurisdiction because of the desirability
of a speedy pronouncement by the court as to the validity of the
statute. State ex rel. Miller v. State Board of Education (1935) 56
Idaho 210, 52 P. (2d) 147; State ex rel. Enright v. Kansas City (1922)
110 Kan. 603, 204 P. 690; 114 A. L. R. 1364.
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procedure. This case, therefore, might be in accord with a mi-
nority that do grant declaratory judgments of an advisory char-
acter when special circumstances warrant doing so.
In Gullickson v. MitcheUr the Governor had appointed
Gullickson as "acting" Attorney General to replace Bonner who
had entered the armed services. Gullickson undertook his duties
as "acting" Attorney General, but Mitchell as Secretary of
State refused to attest acts of Gullickson as "acting" Attorney
General, claiming that the law creating the office of "acting"
Attorney General was unconstitutional. The Court declared,
"What is authorized is the appointment of an Attorney General
of indefinite tenure within the elected term and not the existence
of two officers one who is the 'Attorney General' although de-
tached from duty and another who is 'Acting Attorney Gen-
eral'." Thus with this declaration of constitutionality a con-
troversy was settled and each officer was informed as to his
official status.
In Bottomly, Attorney General v. Meager County," one
William Gaspar, a resident of Meagher County, died leaving
property to escheat to the state. The state claimed the funds
from Gaspar's estate under a constitutional provision direct-
ing that the funds be paid into the public school fund while the
county claimed the fund by virtue of a recent legislative act"
that provided such funds were to be paid into the county general
fund. From this brief statement of the facts it is clear that a
controversy existed and that the attorney general as legal repre-
sentative of the state, enjoined to protect its interest, was entitled
to a declaratory judgment to determine the constitutionality of
the statute.
The final case for consideration is Carey, State Treasurer v.
McFatridge." In this case the Montana Liquor Control Board
had received an offer from a liquor producer for the sale of
fifteen thousand cases of whiskey, but one of the terms of sale
required that the Board. advance $10.00 a case to be paid the
seller through the First National Bank of Chicago. The Board,
concluding that it did not have authority to make the advance,
conceived a plan whereby sundry retail liquor dealers might ad-
vance the money while the Board would negotiate the transac-
tion. The money was paid to the Board who deposited it with
'0(1942) 113 Mont. 359, 126 P. (2d) 1106.
"(1948) 114 Mont. 220, 133 P. (2d) 770.
"MONT. CONST. Art XI 12.
"Ch. 104, LAWS Op MONTANA, 1969.
" (194) 115 Mont. 278, 142 P. (2d) 829.
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the plaintiff, the State Treasurer. The Board then purchased
the liquor and caused a draft to be drawn upon the State Treas-
urer who refused to honor it, contending that the procedure fol-
lowed by the Board to obtain the liquor was irregular and that
he could not honor the draft as the money was to be deposited
in a bank not approved or bonded for the deposit of public
funds. Under this state of facts the Treasurer sought a "de-
claratory judgment to determine his duties, obligations and
status with regard to the draft presented him for payment."
The court declared that the procedure adopted by the Board was
lawful; that the money was "not to be deposited with the bank
as public funds but would be paid to the bank for immediate de-
livery to the sellers under the terms of the contract." Here
again the essential elements for declaratory relief were present
and the case seems clearly within the scope of the Act. If the
declaratory judgment had not been available to the parties to
this action wherein they were able to obtain an immediate judi-
cial pronouncement as to the course they sought to follow, it is
doubtful if such a beneficial transaction could ever have been
concluded.
It will be noticed in these cases that the court only declared
the rights of the litigants. Further relief would be superfluous
as it would hardly be necessary that an officer or department
of the government be coerced into obedience to the law, once
they knew its meaning as determined by the court.' Normally,
a declaration is all that is necessary for the "act proceeds on
the theory that men in their business relations are generally
honest and that they are willing to discharge their obilgations
when they are authoritatively informed as to what those obliga-
tions are.'" However, coercive relief may be demanded either
in association with or as a supplement to declaratory relief,
should the declaration not be observed.' On the other hand,
w"We do not, however, deem it necessary to grant the injunctive relief
requested. Respondents admit that the issue presented is essentially
one of law. We are certain that when the law is settled It will be
obeyed by responsible public officialsi that an Injunction would be
nothing more than a mere formality, and that it Is not necessary for
one branch of the government to restrain another in order to obtain
obedience for declared law." Stratton v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co., 282
U. S. 10.
"Potts, Some Practical Uses of the Declaratory Judgmeta Law (1943)
22 TExAs LAw REvrEw 309, 826.
"'Under Section 8, If the losing party fails to respect the rights as de-
clared by the court, the court may grant such further relief as may be
necessary and proper. The sword of Justice is always at hand, but it
is not exhibited or brought Into use until the need of it arises." Potts,
op. cit. supra note 86, p. 310.
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this course of procedure may be followed for the reason that if
the coercive relief be denied the court can still proceed with the
substantive issues and grant a declaration that may for all prac-
tical purposes produce the same result."
Thus, though the declaratory judgment may at first blush
seem only to declare rights, it in reality does much more:
"It enables disputes to be determined in their incipiency
before they have grown into devastating battles .... A de-
cision is obtainable without the prior necessity of a pur-
ported violation of law or precarious leap in the dark.... It
enables the citizen to avoid the extraordinary legal remedies
and injunctions that have accumulated so vast a cargo of
technicalities that the complainant desirous of challenging
an administrative power or privilege finds himself frequent-
ly engulfed in a procedural bog which bars him from his
goal. I pi
"And, most important of all, since no wrong is charged
against the defendant and no damages are asked for, there
is present in most such cases a notable absence of the bit-
terness and hostility frequently present in ordinary damage
suits and the litigants are able to continue their business
relations.' Arthur Martin
"State ex rel. Smith v. Board of Commissioners of Shawnee County,(1931) 132 Kan. 233, 294 P. 915. (quo warranto plus declaration
asked; quo warranto denied, declaration granted.)
In a case where the sewer of a municipal corporation emptied into
that of another under an agreement held ultra vires, the court con-
sidered the great inc6nvenience of suddenly closing a sewer in daily
use and refused the injunction, but declared the plaintiff's right to
relief with leave to apply for an injunction after a reasonable time,
should the defendant fail to make other arrangements. Islington Ves-
try v. Hornsey U. D. C, C. A. (1900) 1 Ch. 695.
uBorchard, op. cit. supra note p. XV.
"4Potts, op. cit. supra note 36, p. 326.
MONTANA AND THE FEDERAL JUDGMENT LIEN
Does the judgment of a federal court rendered in Mon-
tana become a lien as soon as docketed by the clerk of the
Federal court? Must a title searcher in Montana go to the
office of the Federal District Court to be sure there is no
judgment lien against his property? These questions indicate
the murky' atmosphere surrounding Federal judgment liens
in this state since the decision of Rhea v Smith.'
'WEnsTER's Nuw INTzRNAnONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1940) dark; ob-
scure; thick or impenetrable.
2Rhea v. Smith (1927) 47 S. Ct. 698, 274 U. S. 434, 71 L. Ed. 1139.
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